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"WILL YOU STILL NEED ME ... WHEN I'M SIXTY-
FOUR?"*: FORCED RETIREMENT FOR 
EXECUTIVES UNDER THE ADEA 
Mark A. Shaikent 
"If, as Dostoevski observed, one test of a civilization is the way 
in which it treats its elderly, the existence of age-based 
mandatory retirement in the u.s. earns our country poor 
marks. "1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ralph Waldo Emerson once said, "Old age is not disgraceful, but 
immensely disadvantageous."2 In 1967, Congress sought to make old 
age less disadvantageous by passing the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA),3 designed to promote "employment of older 
persons based on their ability rather than age.,,4 Although Congress 
thereby outlawed many discriminato7 employment practices, one 
practice, that of involuntary retirement, continued. Eleven years later, 
the ADEA was amended to proscribe most forms of involuntary retire-
ment for workers forty to seventy years old.6 With that amendment, 
however, came an additional provision which excepted employees oc-
cupying executive or high policymaking positions from the Act's pro-
tection against forced retirement. 7 
This article examines involuntary retirement in the United States 
both before and after the adoption of the ADEA and focuses on the 
exception in the ADEA that permits involuntary retirement of high 
level employees. The author criticizes the exception as lacking statisti-
cal and logical support and contravening the stated purposes of the Act. 
II. SOCIETAL ATTITUDES - THE NEED FOR 
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
One commentator has noted that formal age discrimination in em-
ployment was born when mandatory retirement was institutionalized in 
• P. McCartney and J. Lennon. 
t B.A., Haverford College, 1977; J.D., Washburn University, 1981; Member, Kan-
sas Bar. Mr. Shaiken is currently a clerk for the Honorable Judge James A. Pu-
sateri of the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Kansas. 
1. Pepper, We Shouldn't Have to Retire at 6.5, WASH. POST PARADE MAG., Sept. 4, 
1977, at 12, 15 [hereinafter cited as Pepper]. 
2. R.W. EMERSON, Old Ag~ in SOCIETY AND SOLITUDE 320 (4th ed. 1904). 
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). 
4. Id § 621(b) (1976). 
5. The terms "mandatory," "forced," and "involuntary" retirement are used inter-
changeably in this article and are. intended to describe the situation in which an 
employer determines at what age an employee must retire, regardless of the em-
ployee's wishes. 
6. 29 U.S.C. § 63 1 (a) (Supp. II 1978) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976». 
7. Id § 631(c)(I). 
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Germany in 1889.8 As a political maneuver, Chancellor Otto Von Bis-
marck declared that sixty-five was the age of mandatory retirement.9 
During the twentieth century the practice of involuntary retirement has 
become the first phase of a type of "social conspiracy," whereby per-
sons are forced to retire, "put on the shelves, kicked upstairs . . . , 
stripped of their raison d'~tre, and grossly exploited economically."l0 
The number of conspirators has grown to the point that age discrimina-
tion is an omnipresent employment practice. 
Age discrimination differs in many ways from other forms of dis-
crimination. Employers who refuse to hire older workers or who insist 
on a fixed age of retirement are not motivated by malice or dislike. 11 A 
1977 survey by Harvard Business Review suggests that employers sub-
consciously engage in age discrimination and when asked for their 
opinions about older workers, the employers generally favored elimina-
tion of involuntary retirement. 12 The survey indicates that subcon-
scious discrimination often is based on unsubstantiated and false 
assumptions regarding an older worker's inability to meet the physical 
and mental demands of a job. 13 These attitudes, though nonexistent in 
ancient Greek, Chinese or Roman societies,14 are today deeply imbed-
ded in our minds by advertisements portraying everyone as young and 
vigorous. These advertisements suggest that people over fifty have only 
to look forward to retirement, senility and "demise under the sun of the 
South's golden rim."IS . 
8. See Hansen, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments 0/ 1978: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 85, 88 n.23 (1979). 
9. Id Bismarck was trying "to thwart an impetus toward socialism. At the time the 
average life expectancy was from 40-45 years. Chancellor Bismarck initiated the 
policy with the understanding that very few individuals would be able to collect 
on this social insurance program." Id . 
to. Pruyser, Aging: Downward, Upward, or Forward?, in TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF 
AGING 102, 107 (S. Hiltner ed. 1975). 
11. Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: The Problem 0/ the Older Worker, 41 
N.Y.V.L. REV. 383, 394 (1966). 
12. Rosen & Jerdee, Too Old or Not Too Old, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov. 1977, at 97. 
13. Id Some of the false assumptions are: older workers cannot meet the physical 
requirements of the job; are less adaptable to the job; have a greater tendency to 
be absent and to have accidents; resent younger supervisors; are set in their ways; 
have less drive and enthusiasm; and, performance and intelligence decreases Wlth 
age. Id Most employers who believe these attitudes have factual bases are never-
theless satisfied with older workers, as compared to younger workers, in nine out 
of ten characteristics of job performance. Note, Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment: The Problem of the Older Worker, 41 N.Y.V.L. REv. 383, 394 (1966). From 
studies performed, there is simply no evidence that an older employee is necessar-
ily a less competent employee. Note, The Cost of Growing Old' Business Necessity 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565, 577 (1979). See 
also Werner, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments 0/1978 and 
Their Effect on Collective Bargaining, 30 LAB. L.J. 477, 477-78 (1979) (Indeed, in 
many tasks the older workers perform better than the younger ones.). 
14. Whiteside & Batt, The Effects 0/ Mandatory Retirement, 18 J. FAM. L. 761, 764 
(1980). 
15. Id at 762. 
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Prior to the adoption of the ADEA, neither the judiciary nor the 
Congress worked to alleviate the effects of these attitudes. At common 
law, an employer was not prevented from discharging an employee 
based on age. 16 Furthermore, although Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex 
or nationality,17 it does not proscribe age discrimination. 
III. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967 
"Hundreds of thousands not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, 
find themselves jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination."18 
With this statement, President Johnson recommended the adoption of 
legislation to prevent such discrimination. 19 When the ADEA was 
passed, it became unlawful for employers, employment agencies, and 
labor organizations20 to engage in age discrimination when a person 
was between the ages of forty and sixty-five.21 Prohibited discrimina-
tion included refusing to hire, discharging, or generally discriminating 
with respect to compensation or terms of employment when the action 
or decision was based solely on age.22 Although not specifically men-
tioning involuntary retirement as a proscribed discriminatory employ-
ment practice, the ADEA appeared to prevent forced retirement of 
individuals within the protected age group because it was an employ-
ment policy based solely on age . 
. Employers seeking to validate involuntary retirement programs, 
16. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States Steel Corp., 348 Mass. 168, 202 N.E.2d 816 
(1964); 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 226 (1976). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
18. 113 CONGo REc. 34, 743, 744 (1967) (remarks of President Johnson). 
19. Purver, Age as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Under AIJEA, in 15 AM. 
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 488 (1978). 
20. The terms "employer," "employment agency," and "labor organization" are de-
fined in the Act. See 29 U.S.c. § 63O(b)-(d) (1976). An employer is 
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or 
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calen-
dar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. . . . The term also 
means (I) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivi-
sionof a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political 
subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency, but such term does not 
include the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the Gov-
ernment of the United States. 
Id. § 630(b). An "employment agency" is "any person regularly undertaking with 
or without compensation to procure employees for an employer and includes an 
agent of such a person, but shall not include an agency of the United States." Id. 
§ 630(c). A "labor organization" is "a labor organization engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce, and any agent of such an organization, and includes any or-
ganization of any kind . . . in which employees participate and which exists for 
the purpose. . . of dealing with employers concerning. . . terms or conditions of 
employment." Id. § 630(d). -
21. Id. § 631 (amended 1978) (changing protected age group to 40-70 years old). 
22. See Annot., 24 A.L.R. FED. 808, 824 (1975). 
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however, seized upon a subsection of the ADEA, 623(f)(2),23 allowing 
an employer ''to observe the terms of. . . any bona fide employee ben-
efit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a 
subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter.,,24 Employers argued 
that this subsection was an exception authorizing involuntary retire-
ment pursuant to a bona fide retirement pension plan.2s The federal 
courts differed in their interpretation of section 623(f)(2). The United 
States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits determined 
that the provision did allow involuntary retirement of persons pro-
tected under the Act.26 The Third Circuit, distinguishing between out-
right discharge and retirement, noted, "While cognizant of the 
disruptive effect retirement may have on individuals, Congress contin-
ued to regard retirement plans favorably and chose therefore to legis-
late only with respect to discharge."27 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, in McMann v. United Air 
Lines, Inc. 28 rejected the Third Circuit's interpretation and held that 
involuntary retirement was not allowed unless the employer could 
show the early retirement policies had some economic or business pur-
. pose other than arbitrary age discrimination. 29 
Another issue on which the federal courts disagreed was whether a 
retirement or pension plan constituted a subterfuge evading the Act's 
purposes. This issue arose in many forms. In Steiner v. National 
23. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976) (amended 1978). 
24. Id 
25. See, e.g., Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1974). See 
also Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901, 905 (3d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 
1008 (1978). 
26. Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 
(1978); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974). In Zinger, 
the plaintiff had worked for thirty-one years as a staff attorney for Penn Central. 
Seven months prior to his sixty-fifth birthday, he was forced into early retirement 
and given a pension pursuant to company policy. Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 
at 903. He then brought suit seeking an injunction and damages to increase his 
pension to what it would have been had he remained an employee until age sixty-
five. Id at 901. Zinger contended that the ADEA proscribed involuntary retire-
ment before sixty-five. Id at 904. Similarly, in Brennan, the Secretary of Labor 
brought suit under the ADEA alleging that the defendant employer had violated 
the Act by compelling the employee to retire at age sixty in accordance with a 
retirement plan and refusing to rehire him. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 
500 F.2d at 215. The Secretary sought an injunction and damages. Id at 213. 
27. Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901,905 (3d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 
(1978). Other courts implicitly reached the same result in holding that various 
retirement/pension plans satisfied the "bona fide" and no "subterfuge" require-
ment of§ 623(f)(2). See, e.g., de Loraine v. MEBA Pension Trust, 499 F.2d 49 (2d 
Cir.), cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Steiner v. National League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs, 377 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1974). For a discussion of 
these cases, see text accompanying notes 30-35 infra. 
28. 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). 
29. Id at 221. The court found that § 623(f)(2) only authorized an adjustment of 
benefits a retiree could receive under a pension plan. See id at 222 n.6. 
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League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 30 a plan for National League 
umpires required retirement on a specified date in the year an umpire 
became fifty-five, unless permission for later retirement was obtained 
from the League. The United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California held that the plan was not a subterfuge.31 First, the 
plan was adopted years before the ADEA was enacted. Second, by 
reference to labor regulations,32 the court determined that a bona fide 
plan was not rendered invalid simply because it provided an employer 
with discretion to permit some employees to work beyond the plan's 
retirement age.33 In de Loraine v. MEBA Pension Trust, 34 a labor union 
plan provided for mandatory retirement and imposed a forfeiture of 
plan benefits if the retiree returned to employment in the industry. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held the plan to 
be bona fide and not a subterfuge.35 Other courts, however, created a 
presumption of subterfuge.36 For example, one court held that lower-
ing the mandatory retirement age from sixty-five to sixty-two in a plan 
was prima facie evidence of a subterfuge.37 The federal courts of ap-
peals and an administrative agency also differed in their opinions as to 
whether a plan adopted before enactment of the ADEA could be a sub-
terfuge. The Fifth Circuit held that a finding of subterfuge was pre-
cluded if the plan was adopted prior to enactment of the ADEA.38 The 
Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor 
agreed.39 The Fourth Circuit held a plan adopted before the ADEA 
was enacted could be a subterfuge,40 and the Third Circuit agreed.41 
30. 377 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1974). 
31. Id at 948. 
32. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.110 (1981). 
33. 377 F. Supp. 945, 949 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The court also found that plaintiffs per-
formance rating in his last year was very low, and that those umpires who were 
permitted to work beyond the plan's retirement age had very high performance 
ratings. Id at 947-48. 
34. 499 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied., 419 U.S. 1009 (1974). 
35. Id at 50. 
36. See Marshall v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 474 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1979). Contra, 
Marshall v. Atlantic Container Line, G.I.E., 470 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(lowering age not prima facie subterfuge). See also EEOC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 
632 F.2d 1107 (4th Cir. 1980) (prima facie subterfuge when company selected 
employees for retirement on basis of age-related pension entitlement and thereaf-
ter reduced mandatory retirement age), cert. denied., 102 S. Ct. 113 (1981). 
37. Marshall v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 474 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1979). 
38. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1974). 
39. See French & Batten, The 1978 Amendments to AJ)EA: Impact of Section 4(/}(2) on 
Employee Benefit Systems, 4 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 351,353-54 (1978) 
(citing Wage & Hour Div., Wage and Labor Standards Admin., U.S. Dep't of 
Labor, Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: Interpretive Bulletin 
(1970), codified in Age Discrimination in Employment, 29 C.F.R. § 860 (1981». 
In accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976), 
the Secretary of Labor was authorized to issue rules and regulations to carry out 
the purposes of the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1976). 
40. McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd., 434 U.S. 
192 (1977). 
41. Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901, 904-05 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied., 434 U.S. 
1008 (1978). 
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in United Air 
Lines, Inc. v. McMann 42 to resolve the conflict in the circuits as to the 
following issues: (1) whether section 623(f)(2) was an exception author-
izing involuntary retirement of persons within the protected age group; 
(2) what types of retirement or pension plans constituted a subterfuge; 
and (3) whether a plan adopted prior to the ADEA's enactment could 
be a subterfuge. Addressing the first issue, the Court held that section 
623(f)(2) did authorize involuntary retirement.43 The majority, point-
ing to the plain language of the provision, agreed with the Third Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the statute.44 The dissenting justices45 strongly 
protested, finding that the statutory language was not clear because it 
was susceptible of two interpretations: either the section permitted 
forced retirement of an employee within the protected age group or it 
allowed different treatment of older employees only with respect to 
benefits paid or available under a retirement plan.46 The dissenters 
indicated that the ADEA, in its original form, allowed employers to 
" 'separate involuntarily an employee under a retirement policy or sys-
tem.' "47 Noting that this provision was deleted from the ADEA prior 
to its adoption, they concluded that Congress also removed "authoriza-
tion for involuntary retirement from the exceptions to the statute's 
prohibitions. "48 
Confronting the subterfuge issues, the Court defined subterfuge as 
a scheme, plan, or artifice of evasion.49 It agreed with the Fifth Circuit 
that a plan adopted before the ADEA was enacted could not have been 
used to evade an act not yet in existence and, thus, could not be a sub-
terfuge.50 Justices White,51 Marshall, and Brennan52 disagreed, claim-
ing that the date of adoption did not insulate a plan from a subterfuge 
finding. 
After the Supreme Court's decision, it became apparent that only 
four requirements were necessary to force employees within the ADEA 
protected age group to retire. First, involuntary retirement had to be 
pursuant to an employee benefit plan, such as a profit-sharing retire-
ment plan,53 but not a plan in which the individual employee did not 
42. 434 U.S. 192 (1977). 
43. Id. at 199, 203. 
44. Id. at 204. 
45. Justice Marshall was joined in his dissent by Justice Brennan. 
46. Id. at 209-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
47. Id. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing S. 830 and H.R. 4221, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1967». 
48. Id. at 212-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
49. Id. at 203. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 204-05 (White, J., concurring). 
52. Id. at 219 n.13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
53. See Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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participate. 54 Second, the plan had to be bona fide. A plan was bona 
fide if it was ~enuine, authentic, and actually paid substantial benefits 
to the retiree. 5 Third, the plan had to authorize early retirement at a 
specified age. Section 623(f)(2) did not permit involunta7, retirement 
of an employee prior to a plan's specified retirement age.5 Finally, the 
plan could not be a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA. 57 
Although the Supreme Court's decision in United Air Lines 
seemed to settle most involuntary retirement issues, the decision soon 
became moot. Congress, dissatisfied with judicial interpretations of 
section 623 (f)(2), passed an amendment to the provision before the 
Supreme Court's opinion was published.58 
IV. 1978 AMENDMENTS 
A. Section 62J(/}(2) 
In amending section 623(f)(2), the House of Representatives con-
ferees expressly disagreed with the Supreme Court's decision in United 
Air Lines and declared that the ADEA did not permit mandatory re-
tirement.59 As amended, the section provides that an employer can 
"observe the terms of a . . . bona fide employee benefit plan . . . ex-
cept that no such employee benefit plan shall. . . require or permit the 
54. See Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225 (D. Minn. 
1971). 
55. See, e.g., Marshall v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 575 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1978); Zinger 
v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901, 909 n.20 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 
(1978). See also United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192,207-08 (1977) 
(White, J., concurring). 
56. Sexton v. Beatrice Foods Co., 630 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980). 
57. See text accompanying notes 30-41 and 49-52 supra. 
58. United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192,218 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Marshall stated, 
Id 
The mischief the Court fashions today may be short lived. Both the 
House and Senate have passed amendments to the Act. . . . The 
amendments . . . expressly provide that the involuntary retirement of 
employees shall not 6e perIDltted or required pursuant to any employee 
benefit plan. Thus, today's decision may have virtually no prospective 
effect. 
59. H.R. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 529. The Conference Report stated that the purpose of 
the amendment is 
to make absolutely c1e;:ar one of the original purposes of this provision, 
namely, that the exception does not authorize an employer to require or 
permit involuntary retirement of an employee within the protected age 
group on account of age. 
In McMann V. United Air Lines . .. the Supreme Court held to the 
contrary . . . . The conferees specifically disagree with the Supreme 
Court's holding and reasoning in that case. 
Id (citation omitted). See Davis V. Boy Scouts of America, 457 F. Supp. 665 
(D.N.J. 1978); French & Batten, The 1978 Amendments to ADEA: Impact of Sec-
tion 4(/}(2) on Employee Benefit Systems, 4 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 351, 
353 (1978). 
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involuntary retirement of any individual" forty to seventy years old 
solely because of the individual's age.60 The amendment, however, is 
not intended to cripple an employer financially.61 As the Fourth Cir-
cuit had pointed out earlier, differentials in benefits under a retirement 
plan are allowed between older and younger workers if the differentials 
are cost justified. Differentials are cost justified when ''the actual 
amount of payments made, or cost incurred in behalf of an older 
worker is equal to that made or incurred in behalf of a younger worker, 
even though the older worker may thereby receive a lesser amount of 
pension or retirement benefits, or insurance coverage:'62 The Depart-
ment of Labor, interpreting the ADEA,63 determined that an_ employer 
was permitted to make a benefit reduction based on age where age was 
"actuarially significant" in the "benefit design:' that is, when the "costs 
of providing a particular benefit to older workers exceeds the cost of 
providing that benefit to younger employees."64 Reduced benefits to an 
older worker without cost justification would probably be considered a 
subterfuge.65 
B. Exceptions Allowing Involuntary Retirement 
With the amendment to and clarification of section 623(f)(2), most 
involuntary retirement issues were laid to rest. However, Congress pro-
vided two exceptions to its proscription of involuntary retirement. 
First, until June 30, 1982, an employee sixty-five years of age or older 
could be forced to retire if "serving under a contract of unlimited ten-
·60. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. II 1978). Courts have held that the amendment ap-
plies prospectively only. See, e.g., Marshall v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 471 
F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1979). 
61. See generally Note, The Cost o/Growing Old' Business Necessity and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565 (1979). 
62. 124 CONGo REC. S4450 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Javits). 
63. For the source of the Department of Labor's authority to issue such interpreta-
tions of the Act, see note 39 supra. 
64. Comment, The Effect o/the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Employee Bene-
fit Plan Exception on Small Businesses, 13 U.C.D. L. REv. 969, 979 (1980). For 
example, age is actuarially significant in providing employment benefits such as 
long term disability, medical, hospital, and life insurance plans, because these in-
surance plans typically cost more for older employees. Id An employer could, 
for example, reduce life insurance coverage of older employees "to a level which 
approximates the cost of providing greater. amounts of insurance for employees 
ages fifty-five to sixty." Id at 980. 
65. French & Batten, The 1978 Amendments to ADEA: Impact of Section 4(j)(2) on 
Employee Benefit Systems, 4 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 351, 364 (1978). 
Therefore, an employer must choose between several alternatives in deciding how 
to distribute benefits to older workers. First, an employer can provide the same 
benefits to all workers, regardless of age. Second, an employer can decide on his 
own which distinctions between age group benefits are allowed. Last, an em-
ployer can hire a consultant. This is the safest of alternatives and the most cost 
prohibitive to a small business employer. See Comment, The Effect of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act Employee Benefit Plan Exception on Small Busi-
nesses, 13 U.C.D. L. REv. 969, 974 (1980). 
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ure. . at an institution of higher learning."66 Litigation soon arose 
regarding the constitutionality of this exception, and courts held that 
the provision does not violate the equal protection or due process pro-
visions of the Constitution, because age is not a suspect class and the 
right to work is not a fundamental right.67 
Potentially more expansive is the second exception, a concession to 
industry'S desires. Industry lobbied for an. exception to the Act that 
would allow involuntary retirement of certain "expensive" employees, 
those occupying high level executive and policymaking positions. 
There are a number of reasons why industry wanted such an amend-
ment. Generally, industry seeks to terminate high level executives for 
three reasons. First, firing high level personnel cuts salary costs and 
pension liabilities.68 Second, it makes room at the top for young 
achievers.69 Third, particularly tempting during recessionary times, 
corporations may thereby trim other excess expenses.70 Industry repre-
sentatives argued that without such an exception, incapable older exec-
utives would have to be fired rather than be allowed to retire with 
66. 29 u.s.c. § 631(d) (Supp. II 1978). 
67. See, e.g., McAloon v. Bryant College of Business Administration, 520 F. Supp. 
103 (D.N.H. 1981). See also Lamb v. Scripps College, 627 F.2d lOIS (9th Cir. 
1980) (considering state provisions that parallel the ADEA). The Lamb and 
McAloon courts relied on Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 
307 (1976), in which the United States Supreme Court described a suspect class as 
a group "[sjaddlt:d with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process." Id. at 313-14. The Murgia Court explained that age is not a suspect 
class, but rather "a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal 
span." Id. A fundamental right, on the other hand, "'simply recognizes ... an 
established constitutional right.'" San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. I, 31 (1973) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969». 
Courts have not recognized the right to work as a fundamental one. San Antonio 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. Accordingly, the rational basis test was 
applied by the Lamb court. Many reasons were given for the tenured professor 
exception, including: employment opportunities would open up for young profes-
sors and minorities; advancement opportunities would be provided for younger 
faculty members with fresh ideas and techniques; and difficulties in evaluating 
professors over sixty-five would be avoided. Lamb v. Scripps College, 627 F.2d at 
1021-22. The Ninth Circuit in Lamb stated, however, 
In rejecting Lamb's equal protection challenge . . ., we make no en-
dorsement of mandatory retirement as a matter of social policy. We are 
aware of both the debilitating effect that compulsory retirement can have 
on an individual, and the potential loss to society in terms of human 
resources that may result therefrom. 
Id. at 1023. Before the 1978 ADEA amendments, mandatory retirement was reg-
ularly held constitutionally valid. See generally Annot., 81 A.L.R.3d 811 (1977). 
68. See Ross, Retirement at Seventy: A New Trauma for Management, FORTUNE, May 
8, 1978, at 106 [hereinafter cited as Rossj; Whiteside & Batt, The Effects of 
Mandatory Retirement, 18 J. FAM. L. 761, 785 (1980). 
69. Pepper, supra note I, at 15; Whiteside & Batt, The Effects of Mandatory Retire-
ment, 18 J. FAM. L. 761, 784 (1980). 
70. Pepper, supra note 1, at 15; see Ross, supra note 68, at 107. 
1982) Forced Retirement for Executives 265 
dignity.71 Furthermore, without a system of involuntary retirement, an 
employer would be forced to make individual determinations of 
fitness.72 This would be more time consuming, less convenient, and 
less equitable than involuntary retirement. Finally, industry represent-
atives argued that without a system of involuntary retirement, the over-
all retirement picture would no longer be certain, and an employer 
could not accurately predict its staffing needs.73 
Industry, however, did not convince all congressmen. Senator Ja-
cob Javits opposed this exception because mandatory retirement at any 
age fails to account for the effects of aging on different skills, and a 
system of mandatory retirement accelerates an individual's aging pro-
cesS.74 Senators Allan Cranston and Donald Riegle argued that com-
petence, not age, should determine job performance capability 
regardless of the work involved. They also opposed the exception be-
cause industry did not present any data to substantiate the need for it.75 
Although Congress recognized that mandatory retirement could 
be harmful to both the individual and society,16 it also recognized that 
without mandatory retirement, employment opportunities would not 
be open to younger employees.77 Therefore, it passed section 63 I (c), 
which allows involuntary retirement of an employee sixty-five years of 
age or older if the employee 
for the two year period immediately before retirement, is em-
ployed in a bona fide executive or high policymaking posi-
tion, if such employee is entitled to an immediate 
nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from a pension, 
profit-sharing saving, or deferred compensation plan, or any 
combination of such. plans, of the employer of sucn employee, 
71. Pepper, supra note I, at 15; Ross, supra note 68,at 1l0. 
72. Pepper, supra note I, at 15; Ross, supra note 68, at 110. 
73. Pepper, supra note I, at 15; Ross, supra note 68, at 110. 
74. S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-33 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 525-27. 
75. S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-35 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 527-28. 
76. S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 507. The report provided, "Substantial evidence exists 
that mandatory retirement may have a severe deteriorative impact on the physical 
and psychological health of older individuals. . . . It detracts from the quality of 
life by taking away a sense of fulfillment and self-sufficiency .... " Id 
77. S. REp. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 510-11. During the committee's deliberations, 
concerns were expressed regarding the impact that the elimination of 
mandatory retirement would have on the ability of employers to assure 
promotional opportunities for younger workers. 
Therefore m order to permit employers to replace certain key em-
ployees and to keep promotional channels open for younger employees, 
the committee adopted an amendment offered by Senator Pell which 
would permit compulsory retirement of highly compensated manage-
ment employees at age 65 . . . . 
Id 
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which equals, in the aggregate, at least $27,000.78 
Congress thereby provided two major elements that must be present 
before section 631(c) can operate to except an employee from the pro-
scription of mandatory retirement. First, an employee must qualify as 
a bona fide executive (BFE) or high policymaker (HP).79 Second, an 
employee must have an annual retirement salary of at least $27,000.80 
1. Qualifying as a Bona Fide Executive or High Policymaker 
The House conferees intended that the definition of BFE promul-
gated in regulations by the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Di-
vision should apply to the ADEA executive.8! These regulations 
provide that a BFE is any employee who: (1) primarily manages a de-
partment of an enterprise; (2) directs two or more employees; (3) has 
authority to hire, fire, or whose suggestions for hiring and firing are 
given particular weight; (4) has discretionary powers; (5) devotes 80% 
or more of the work week to these activities; and (6) earns at least $250 
a week in the private sector.82 The House conferees also suggested a 
number of other factors necessary for an employee to be a BFE. Their 
suggestions were made in the context of a corporate enterprise, but 
were not intended to exclude any employer covered by the Act.83 The 
conferees indicated that BFE's should include "the head of a significant 
and substantial local or regional operation of a corporation, such as a 
major production facility or retail establishment."84 In the conferees' 
opinion, the exception should also apply to "individuals at higher levels 
in the corporate organizational structure" with responsibility and au-
thority comparable to or greater than the head of a corporate opera-
tion.85 In addition, heads of major divisions of a corporation located at 
the corporate or regional headquarters, such as the head of the "fi-
nance, marketing, legal, production and manufacturing" departments 
were included in their suggestions.86 In larger corporations, ''the im-
mediate subordinates" of department or division heads could also be 
BFE's.87 
78. 29 U.S.c. § 631(c)(1) (Supp. II 1978). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. H.R. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 530. The definition of bona fide executive originally 
appeared in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 which excluded BFE's from its 
protection against detrimental labor conditions. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1976 & 
Supp. II 1978). 
82. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(a)-(f) (1981). 
83. H.R. REp. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 531. 
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These suggestions were incorporated into rules promulgated by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).88 Under the 
EEOC rules, both the Wage and Hour Division criteria and the House 
conferees' suggestions must be satisfied before an individual can be la-
beled a BFE and forced to retire before age seventy.89 The EEOC rules 
make it clear that the BFE exception "does not apply to middle-man-
agement employees, no matter how great their retirement income, but 
only to a very few top level employees who exercise substantial execu-
tive authority over a significant number of employees and a large vol-
ume of business."90 
If an employee is not a BFE, involuntary retirement is still permis-
sible if the employee is in a high policymaking position.91 An HP does 
not have a BFE's authority, "but [their]. . . position and responsibility 
are such that they play a significant role in the development of corpo-
rate policy and effectively recommend the implementation thereof."92 
Examples of HP's are chief economists and chief research scientists.93 
Finally, the BFE or HP must have occupied the position for the 
two years immediately prior to retirement.94 Congress added the two-
year requirement to prevent employers "from circumventing the law by 
appointing an employee to" an executive position shortly before com-
pelling the employee's retirement.9S 
2. Retirement Income 
Even if an employee qualifies as a BFE or HP, forced retirement 
before age seventy is still prohibited unless the employee's annual re-
tirement salary is at least $27,000.96 Originally the Senate set the an-
nual salary figure at $20,000 and provided for an annual cost-of-living 
88. Id See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12 (1981). 
Promulgating rules for the ADEA was originally the function of the Department 
of Labor's Wage and Hour Division. See note 39 supra. Pursuant to the Presi-
dent's Reorganization Plan, the responsibility for enforcement of the ADEA was 
transferred to the EEOC. The purpose of the reorganization was to centralize, in 
one agency, the enforcement and regulation of all equal opportunity laws. See 
Comment, The Effect of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Employee Bene-
fit Plan Exception on Small Businesses, 13 U.C.D. L. REv. 969, 977 n.37 (1980). 
89. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(a)-(d)(2) (1981). 
90. Id § 1625.12(d)(2). 
91. 29 U.S.c. § 631(c)(1) (Supp. II 1978). 
92. H.R. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 531. 
93. Id 
94. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(I) (Supp. II 1978); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 
C.F.R. § 1625.12(f) (1981). 
95. H.R. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 530. 
96. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(I) (Supp. II 1978); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 
C.F.R. § 1625.12(j)(1) (1981). 
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adjustment.97 The House conferees raised the annual salary to $27,000 
and eliminated any annual adjustments.98 
A number of limitations are placed on the computation of the 
$27,000 annual salary figure. Only the important limitations are high-
lighted here. The benefits comprising the annual salary must be non-
forfeitable. 99 If retirement benefits are to cease, for example, when the 
employee sues the former employer, or when the employee works for 
the former employer's competitors, then the plan's benefits are forfeita-
ble and are not counted toward the $27,000 annual figure. lOO The re-
tirement plan must offer the employee the option to receive payments 
of either: (1) $27,000 per year, each year after retirement; 101 (2) a lump 
sum with which the employee could purchase one life annuity yielding 
at least $27,000 annually;102 (3) benefits of an aggregate value on the 
date of retirement based on the employee's life expectancy of $27,000 
annually; 103 (4) any other option the employee chooses if the previous 
options are available. I04 Only pension, profit-sharing, and savings de-
ferred compensation plans, or combinations of these plans are counted 
toward the retirement income. 105 Social security, employee and roll-
over contributions are excluded from the retirement income calcula-
tion. I06 Significantly, contributions of £rior employers are also not 
counted toward the retirement income. I 
C Effect of Section 63J(c) 
Actual statistics on the potential effect of section 63 I (c) are few, in 
part because no statistics were presented to Congress before section 
631(c) was adopted. Also, no judicial decisions have addressed this 
provision. Industry leaders, however, have made some guesses. The 
president of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company estimated that only 
executive employees with long service and earning in excess of $50,000 
per year will be subject to involuntary retirement under section 
63 I (c). 108 A General Motors (GM) executive estimated that twelve to 
97. S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1977), reprinted in (1978) U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 511. 
98. H.R. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in (1978) U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 530. 
99. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(k)(1) (1981). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. § 1627.17(c)(1). 
102. Id. § 1627.17(c)(2). 
103. Id. § 1627.17(c)(3). 
104. Id. § 1627.l7(c)(4). 
105. Id. § 1627.17(d). Plans include "stock bonus, thrift and simplified employee pen-
sions." Id. Plans excluded are health and life insurance plans. Id. 
106. These terms are as defined in 26 U.S.C. §§ 41 1 (c), 402(a)(5), 403(a)(4), 408(d)(3), 
409(b)(3)(C) (Supp. IV 1981). 
107. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1627.17(e) (1981). See text 
accompanying note 114 infra. 
108. See Ross, supra note 68, at 111. 
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fifteen percent of GM's top executives would have been subject to the 
section 63 1 (c) exception between the years 1976 and 1978. 109 
V. CRITICISMS 
Several congressmen have criticized section 631(c) as a perpetua-
tion of documented involuntary retirement evils. 110 Furthermore, one 
commentator has noted that "[by] allowing a group to qualify for 
mandatory retirement on the basis of income and job responsibility 
alone without requiring a determination of vocational competence, this 
amendment on its face contradicts its stated purpose - to broaden and 
strengthen the Act's coverage and further eliminate arbitrary discrimi-
nation based on age."lll 
Many of the reasons given by industry lobbyists to convince Con-
gress to adopt a BFE exceptionll2 are groundless and untenable. For 
example, industry claimed that mandatory retirement would relieve 
employers of the costly burden of determining which employees were 
competent. Employers, however, regularly evaluate all employees in 
making personnel decisions. 113 Industry offered no explanation in sup-
port of its argument, and it is difficult to understand how mandatory 
retirement of BFE's reduces the cost of employee evaluations. There is 
also no equity or dignity in forcing all BFE's to retire, rather than de-
termining which employees are competent and allowing the competent 
employees to continue working. Industry claimed that mandatory re-
tirement was necessary to accurately predict the overall retirement pic-
ture and staffing needs. Seventy-year-old employees, however, are not 
protected under the ADEA, and can be forced to retire. The 
knowledge that some employees can be forced to retire before they 
reach age seventy cannot possibly allow more accurate predictions of 
staffing needs than the knowledge that all employees can be forced to 
retire when they reach that age. 
In times of high inflation and uncertain economic trends, the 
House conferees' decision to remove the cost-of-living adjustment in 
the annual retirement salary figure is curious. As salaries spiral up-
ward with concomitant increase in retirement benefits, more employees 
inevitably will come within the purview of the BFE exception because 
more employees will have an annual retirement salary of $27,000. Fur-
thermore, the $27,000 annual retirement income requirement creates 
some anomalies when comparing long serving and short serving em-
ployees of the same age and rank. Since retirement contributions of 
100.Id 
110. See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra. See also Pepper, supra note 1, at 15. 
Ill. Note, Age IJiscrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978: A Questionable 
Expansion, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 767, 782 (1978). 
112. See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra. 
113. Note, The Cost of Growing Old' Business Necessity and the Age IJiscrimination in 
Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565, 578 (1979). 
270 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 11 
prior employers are not included in the $27,000 annual income, .two 
sixty-five-year-old executives may receive different treatment if there is 
a disparity in the number of years each has worked for the employer. 
For example, an executive who has worked for thirty years may be 
forced to retire because he meets the dollar requirements, whereas an-
other executive who has worked for only twelve years would be al-
lowed to continue working. I 14 
Justice Marshall, interpreting section 623(f)(2) in his dissent in 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, liS pointed out an anomaly which is 
also applicable to the BFE exception. A BFE who is forced to retire 
before age seventy can reapply for the employee's old job. Under the 
ADEA, the employee cannot be denied employment because of age, 116 
and, "as someone with experience in performing the tasks of the 'va-
cant' job he once held, the individual1ikely will be better qualified than . 
any other applicant. Thus the individual retired one day would have to 
be hired the next."ll7 It seems incongruous that Congress, in enacting 
the 1978 amendments, adopted Justice Marshall's interpretation of the 
ADEA 118 without realizing that this anomaly applied equally to 
BFE's. 
Certainly other alternatives exist to protect the desires of industry 
employers. For instance, limitations on an employee's years of service 
in anyone position could be imposed. An employer could rotate per-
sonnel between divisions, offer increased benefits to early retirees, or 
develop performance tests under section 623(f)(1 )}l9 "In light of those 
alternatives, Congress may have been ill-advised to respond totally to 
business needs by removing [BFE's] ... from the Act's coverage."120 
Even more disconcerting is that employers can still attempt to ter-
minate high salaried executives who might not qualify as BFE's despite 
section 623 (f)(2). An employee alleging discrimination in violation of 
114. Ross, supra note 68, at 112. "Jones, with thirty years' service, has to retire at sixty-
five because he meets the dollar requirements, whereas Smith, with twelve years' 
service can stay on. Smith may have the same pension expectations as Jones, but 
not from a single employer." Id 
115. 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
116. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1976), which provides: "It shall be unlawful for an 
employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age . . . ." 
117. United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 217 (1977) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
118. See note 58 and accompanying text supra. 
119. Pursuant to § 623(t)(1), an employer may "take any action ... where age is a 
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation 
of the particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable fac-
tors other than age." 29 U.S.c. § 623(t)(1) (1976); see Note, Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act Amendments of 1978: A Questionable Expansion, 27 CATH. U.L. 
REv. 767, 782 (1978). 
120. Note, Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments 0/ 1978: A Questionable 
Expansion, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 767, 783 (1978). 
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the ADEA must demonstrate a prima facie case - that he is within the 
protected age group and that age was a "determinative consideration" 
in his discharge. 12 The employer must then rebut by producing evi-
dence of "an articulate, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for" the 
employee's discharge. 122 One plaintiffs attorney, criticizing this judge-
made doctrine, speculated, "A sophisticated employer who wants to get 
rid of an older, too-highly paid executive nowadays is going to do it in 
a subtle way over a period of time by building up a dossier on little 
ways he [messed] Up."123 
In contrast, Congress has left employees remediless. An employee 
arguing against mandatory retirement is faced with rebutting an em-
ployer's assertion that the employee is a BFE or HP. To do this, he 
must argue that his position involves little or no discretion, manage-
ment, control, or input. That is, he must urge that the position is really 
not too important, and that his word on various corporate business de-
. cisions is not highly regarded. If successful in avoiding forced retire-
ment, the employee may find that the job he sought to keep may be 
substantially changed. The job may very well be treated as one of little 
importance when the employee returns to it. Thus allowed to continue 
working, the employee will be stripped of the dignity, power and posi-
tion for which he fought. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Section 631 (c), without statistical substantiation, perpetuates many 
of the same evils Congress sought to eliminate in its disapproval of the 
Supreme Court's holding in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann 124 and 
in its passage of the 1978 amendments to the Act. The same detrimen-
tal effects on health and society exist when considering all workers or 
just BFE's and HP's. The same data showing an employee's ability to 
perform in later years applies to all workers, including BFE's and HP's. 
Indeed, it seems Congress ignored its own purpose and kowtowed in 
the face of industry pressure in passing section 63 1 (c). This exception 
to the involuntary retirement prohibition should be eliminated. 
121. Kerwood v. Mortgage Banker's Ass'n of America, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 
(D.D.C. 1980). 
122. Id at 1309. 
123. Socia/Issues, Wounded Executives Fight Back on Age Bias, Bus. WK., July 21, 
1980, at 109, 114; see, e.g., Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
124. 434 U.S. 192 (1977). 
